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THE PROMISED END — 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
HE debate over physician-assisted suicide has
dramatically shifted to a discussion of consti-
tutional issues. This spring, within a month
of each other, U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals on
both coasts ruled that state prohibitions of assisted
suicide are unconstitutional when applied to physi-
cians who prescribe lethal medication for terminal-
ly ill, competent adults who wish to end their lives.1,2
The Ninth Circuit includes Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
and Washington, and the Second Circuit includes
New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. Both courts
reached the same conclusion but for different legal
reasons.
In the Ninth Circuit, four physicians and three pa-
tients (one dying of AIDS, one of cancer, and anoth-
er of emphysema) challenged a Washington law that
prohibits aiding another person in committing sui-
cide. In the Second Circuit, three physicians and
three patients (two dying of AIDS and one of can-
cer) challenged New York laws that prohibit aiding
another person in committing or attempting sui-
cide. None of these patients were currently suicidal,
but all wanted lethal drugs that they could take if
their suffering became unbearable. All the physicians
said that they felt unable to comply with the re-
quests because of the laws against assisting suicide
(there are no laws against committing suicide). Both
cases present the same two issues: Is there a consti-
tutional right to the assistance of a physician in com-
mitting suicide? And if so, does the state nonetheless
have a sufficient interest to prohibit the exercise of
this right?
THE OPINION OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
The Ninth Circuit Court adopted the term “phy-
sician-assisted suicide” to describe “the prescription
of life-ending medication for use by terminally ill,
competent adult patients who wish to hasten their
deaths” but was not happy with it, saying, “We have
serious doubts that the terms ‘suicide’ and ‘assisted
suicide’ are appropriate legal descriptions of the spe-
cific conduct at issue here.”1 Instead of simply ruling
that the assisted-suicide laws do not apply to the
prescriptions of potentially lethal drugs, the court’s
ambitious eight-to-three opinion, written by Judge
T
Stephen Reinhardt, relied on a substantive due-proc-
ess approach (based on the due-process clause of the
14th Amendment) to create a new constitutional
right: the right to determine “the time and manner
of one’s own death.”1
This new right is broadly worded, but the court
ruled that only a narrow category of patients may
lawfully exercise it: competent, terminally ill adults
who have “lived nearly a full measure” of life and
who want to die with dignity.1 For such patients,
“wracked by pain and deprived of all pleasure, a
state-enforced prohibition on hastening their deaths
condemns them to unrelieved misery or torture.”1
Surely, the court concluded, choosing “whether to
endure or avoid such an existence” is a liberty every
bit as vital as that involved in deciding whether or
not to proceed with a pregnancy.1 In the courts’
words, “Like the decision of whether or not to have
an abortion, the decision how and when to die is
one of ‘the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime,’ a choice ‘central to
personal dignity and autonomy.’”1,3
The other analogy the Ninth Circuit Court relied
on was the removal of feeding tubes. A majority of
the U.S. Supreme Court had agreed that there was
a liberty interest in “refusing unwanted medical
treatment” in the case of Nancy Cruzan, a young
woman in a persistent vegetative state whose family
sought to have a feeding tube discontinued on her
behalf.4 Because Nancy Cruzan would die without
a feeding tube, the Ninth Circuit Court character-
ized the decision in the Cruzan case as having
“necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in has-
tening one’s own death,” thus permitting “suicide
by starvation.”1 The court recognized that “as part
of the tradition of administering comfort care, doc-
tors have been supplying the causal agent of pa-
tients’ deaths for decades”1 and understood that
physicians have justified this prescribing pattern on
the basis of the “double effect — reduce the pa-
tient’s pain and hasten [his or her] death.”1 But the
court rejected the double-effect rationale, saying,
“We see little, if any, difference for constitutional or
ethical purposes between providing medication
with a double effect and providing medication with
a single effect . . . [or] between a doctor’s pulling
the plug on a respirator and . . . prescribing drugs
which will permit a terminally ill patient to end [his
or her] own life.”1
After this new constitutional right is defined, the
only remaining question is whether the state has a
sufficient interest to prohibit its exercise. The court
concluded that it does not: “When patients are no
longer able to pursue liberty or happiness and do
not wish to pursue life, the state’s interest in forcing
them to remain alive is clearly less [than] compel-
ling.”1 The court did, however, call on states to reg-
ulate the practice, suggesting procedural safeguards
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— such as witnesses, waiting periods, second medi-
cal opinions, psychological examinations, and re-
porting procedures — to help avoid “abuse.”1
THE OPINION OF THE
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
One month later, in April, the Second Circuit
Court summarily rejected the Ninth Circuit Court’s
entire substantive due-process analysis as a defensi-
ble way to discover a new constitutional right, con-
cluding simply, “The right to assisted suicide finds
no cognizable basis in the Constitution’s language
or design, even in the very limited cases of those
competent persons who, in the final stages of termi-
nal illness, seek the right to hasten death.”2 But the
Second Circuit Court nonetheless did find a new
constitutional right underlying a doctor’s lethal pre-
scription, based on the equal-protection clause (rath-
er than the due-process clause) of the 14th Amend-
ment. The equal-protection clause requires states to
treat people who are similarly situated in a similar
manner. Although this is superficially a different
constitutional approach from that of the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court, the Second Circuit Court also had to
discover a new constitutional right before it could
conclude that the right was being protected un-
equally by the state.
The Second Circuit Court did this by making two
related assertions: the right to refuse treatment is the
same as the right to “hasten death,” and there is no
distinction between a person who is dependent on
life-support equipment and one who is not. Both as-
sertions are problematic. As to the first, the court ar-
gued that New York treats similarly situated people
unequally because its law permits people “in the fi-
nal stages of terminal illness who are on life support
systems . . . to hasten their deaths by directing the
removal of such systems,” but those not receiving
life support cannot hasten their deaths “by self-admin-
istering prescription drugs.”2 The primary cases cit-
ed for this proposition are Cruzan4 and Eichner,5
even though neither of the two patients involved,
who were both in persistent vegetative states, was
terminally ill, and neither had expressed any desire
to commit suicide. The patient in the Eichner case,
Brother Joseph Fox, was an elderly Catholic brother
of the Society of Mary who had said to his friend,
Father Phillip Eichner, before hernia surgery, “If I
wind up like Karen Quinlan, pull the plug.” Since
suicide is a mortal sin in the Catholic Church, it is
likely that Brother Fox would have been horrified at
the notion that his refusal of a ventilator constituted
suicide. As both Eichner and Cruzan make clear, the
right at stake in these cases is the right to refuse
treatment (even if refusal results in death), and there
is no legal requirement that a person be either ter-
minally ill or in pain to exercise this right. Americans
have never been obligated to accept any or all man-
ner of medical treatment available to prolong life;
the essence of the legal right at stake is the right to
be free from unwanted bodily invasions.
Even more striking is the court’s second assertion,
which is based on its acceptance of Justice Antonin
Scalia’s strange concurring opinion in the Cruzan
case (an opinion that no other justice on the Su-
preme Court joined). Scalia argued that refusals of
treatment that result in death are all suicides, and
that any notion that the patient dies a “natural”
death from the underlying disease is nonsense.4 The
Second Circuit Court adopted Justice Scalia’s posi-
tion, concluding that death after the removal of a
ventilator is “not natural in any sense”; rather, it
brings about “death through asphyxiation.”2 Like-
wise, the Second Circuit Court stated that the re-
moval of artificially delivered fluids and nutrition
causes “death by starvation . . . or dehydration.” In
the court’s words, “The ending of life by these
means is nothing more nor less than assisted sui-
cide.”2 Because it considered both refusing treat-
ment and taking lethal drugs as equally constituting
suicide, the Second Circuit Court concluded that
giving citizens equal protection under the law means
that the state must treat both acts in the same man-
ner. The court argued that because doctors are per-
mitted to “assist” patients being sustained by various
life-support mechanisms to commit suicide by re-
moving them, patients who do not need these med-
ical interventions to continue to live should also be
entitled to the assistance of a physician in commit-
ting suicide.
As to the state’s possible interest in distinguishing
between these acts, the court concluded that the
state has no interest “in requiring the prolongation
of a life that is all but ended.”2 The court continued,
“What business is it of the state to require the con-
tinuation of agony when the result is imminent and
inevitable?”2 The court did not believe it was giving
physicians a new license to kill, since, it believed,
“physicians do not fulfill the role of ‘killer’ by pre-
scribing drugs to hasten death any more than they
do by disconnecting life support systems.”2 The
court did, however, specifically reject euthanasia, dis-
tinguishing it from assisted suicide: “In euthanasia
one causes the death of another by direct and inten-
tional acts. . . . Euthanasia falls within the definition
of murder in New York.”2
DISTINGUISHING GOOD SUICIDES
FROM BAD
Because avoiding the slippery slope is the chief
state interest in prohibiting physician-assisted suicide,
the ability to distinguish objectively between good
and bad suicides is critical. The opinion of the Ninth
Circuit Court overruled a 1995 decision in the same
circuit in which Judge John Noonan, writing for a
two-to-one panel, had concluded that any attempt to
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define the category of constitutionally protected as-
sisted suicides is “inherently unstable,” so that any
right to assisted suicide would ultimately have to be
available to all adults.6 In contrast, the 1996 Ninth
Circuit Court’s decision issued by a larger panel of 11
judges on that court concluded that doctors can ac-
curately distinguish worthy suicides from unworthy
and irrational suicides. In the court’s words:
One of the heartaches of suicide is the senseless loss of a
life ended prematurely. In the case of a terminally ill adult
who ends his life in the final stages of an incurable and
painful degenerative disease, in order to avoid debilitating
pain and a humiliating death, the decision to commit sui-
cide is not senseless, and death does not come too early.
Unlike “the depressed twenty-one year old, the romanti-
cally devastated twenty-eight year old, the alcoholic forty-
year-old” . . . a terminally ill competent adult cannot be
cured . . . [but] can only be maintained in a debilitated
and deteriorating state, unable to enjoy the presence of
family or friends.1
The court found that frustrating the wishes of
such terminally ill patients is “cruel indeed,” and
quoted Kent’s lines from King Lear, spoken immedi-
ately after Lear dies, to buttress its argument: “Vex
not his ghost: O! let him pass; he hates him/That
would upon the rack of this tough world/Stretch
him out longer.” Courts almost never resort to quot-
ing literature, and when they do it, it is usually be-
cause they have no legal argument to support their
conclusion. I believe that is true here, and the court’s
misreading of King Lear only serves to emphasize
how difficult it is to draw lines or make objective as-
sessments in this area. Thus, the seemingly marginal
use of a quotation turns out to be central to under-
standing the entire opinion. Lear did not die because
he was terminally ill or in severe pain. Rather, Lear is
much more like the person who dies because of a
personal emotional tragedy: in Lear’s case, he has just
learned that his one faithful and loving daughter,
Cordelia, has been murdered, and he has just uttered
his famous line over her dead body: “Why should a
dog, a horse, a rat, have life,/And thou no breath at
all?” Earlier that same day, Lear was prepared to
spend many years in prison with Cordelia. But after
her murder, Lear dies of a broken heart. There is no
suicide and no assistance; instead, to the contempo-
rary reader, Kent acts as Lear’s health care agent and
exercises Lear’s right to refuse treatment by ordering
that resuscitation not be attempted. No legal changes
are needed to protect the right of someone in Lear’s
position to refuse treatment.
Taking a line out of context from King Lear par-
allels the way the court took a line out of context
from Casey,3 the Supreme Court decision that reaf-
firmed abortion rights, to use as the basis for the
new constitutional right it enunciated. Unlike assist-
ed suicide, abortion is a legally and medically defin-
able act, and unlike the terminally ill, the category
of persons to whom the right to abortion applies is
objectively verifiable — that is, pregnant women.7
Reliance on Cruzan is also problematic. Cruzan in-
volved the right to refuse treatment, not the right to
“hasten death.” Neither the Missouri Supreme Court
nor the U.S. Supreme Court saw a refusal of artificial
fluids and nutrition by Nancy Cruzan or her parents
on their daughter’s behalf as a possible violation of
Missouri’s law against assisted suicide.8
PHYSICIANS AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
The patients whose cases were presented to these
two courts are all sympathetic, and it is not surpris-
ing that the courts wanted to help them. Cancer and
AIDS often lead to “hard deaths,”9 and patients dy-
ing of these two diseases make up the vast majority
of patients in hospices, as well as of those who seek
the assistance of physicians in committing suicide,10
probably because the final stages of these illnesses
are relatively predictable. What is surprising is that
the courts failed to acknowledge explicitly that it has
never been illegal to prescribe pain medication that
competent terminally ill patients might use to com-
mit suicide, as long as the physicians’ intent is to fos-
ter the patients’ well-being by giving them more
control over their lives and the drugs have independ-
ent legitimate medical uses.11 Such prescription can
legitimately be seen as suicide prevention rather than
assistance in suicide. Neither court could point to
even one case of a physician ever being criminally
prosecuted for the conduct they approve of, and
both courts would have been on much stronger
ground if they had simply acknowledged that intent
matters in criminal law and that prescriptions under
these very limited circumstances are not assisted sui-
cide by definition.11,12
In this regard, it should be noted that the Ninth
Circuit Court’s restatement of the principle of the
double effect, which treats pain relief and death as
equally intended, is false: the principle is that treat-
ing the patients’ pain is acceptable even if the treat-
ment hastens death (which it will, of course, not al-
ways do). Providing medication to control pain has
always been a legitimate and lawful medical act, even
if death or suicide is risked.11,12 There is a difference
between an intended result and an unintended but
accepted consequence. Thus, no physician should
conclude on the basis of the opinion of the Ninth
Circuit Court that providing pain medication that
increases the risk of death is either assistance in sui-
cide or homicide. As one of the dissenting judges in
the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinion, Robert Beezer,
properly notes, when General Dwight D. Eisenhow-
er ordered American troops to the beaches in Nor-
mandy, he knew he was sending many to certain
death, but his purpose was to liberate Europe from
the Nazis. Judge Beezer continued, “The majority’s
theory of ethics would imply that this purpose was
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legally and ethically indistinguishable from a pur-
pose of killing American soldiers.”1
I find it impossible to accept either court’s logic
about the cause of death after refusal of treatment.
If one accepts that Nancy Cruzan “died of starva-
tion” and not from the vegetative condition that
made continued artificial feeding necessary for her
survival, one would also have to accept the conclu-
sion that when physicians stop attempted cardiopul-
monary resuscitation on a patient in cardiac arrest,
what kills the patient is not the arrest but rather the
physician who intentionally stops compressing the
heart. Since the failure to perform cardiopulmonary
resuscitation always “hastens death,” under each
court’s logic, patients who refuse cardiopulmonary
resuscitation would always be committing suicide
(and doctors who write do-not-resuscitate orders
would always be assisting suicide). The failure to dis-
tinguish real causes of death from various medical
tools and techniques that may temporarily substitute
for particular bodily functions is fatal to the logic of
both of these opinions.
This logical failure also helps explain why neither
court could define the right they had discovered or
persuasively limit its exercise to cases involving pre-
scriptions written by physicians for competent, ter-
minally ill patients, limitations that have no basis in
constitutional law.13 The Cruzan and Eichner deci-
sions, after all, support the proposition that the
right to refuse treatment is not lost by incompe-
tence but can be exercised in advance by means of
a living will or the designation of a health care proxy,
and also that an adult need not be terminally ill to
refuse treatment. Of course, one cannot commit sui-
cide by proxy. On the other hand, nothing in the
logic of these opinions would prohibit physicians
from actually injecting lethal doses into patients
who met their other criteria and who were unable
to commit suicide themselves, although the Second
Circuit Court explicitly prohibited this. The Ninth
Circuit Court (but not the Second) also explicitly
protected family and friends working under the di-
rection of a physician but never explained why
either a physician or a prescription drug is consti-
tutionally required. For example, neither court sug-
gested any reason why a physician could not rec-
ommend suicide by gun and instruct a patient or
family member about where to aim it before the pa-
tient pulled the trigger. Since both courts admitted
that there is no constitutional definition of termi-
nal illness, the group of covered patients may en-
compass many with years to live (like Lear) whose
lives no longer bring them joy or happiness, and
certainly seems to include patients with early HIV
infection, Alzheimer’s disease, or cancer. To the ex-
tent that states have an interest in protecting these
persons from physicians who might encourage sui-
cide for reasons other than unrelievable pain or suf-
fering at the end of life, these opinions cannot pre-
vent a slide down the slippery slope.
STATE REGULATIONS
Perhaps recognizing this weakness in their analy-
ses, both courts called for states to regulate physi-
cian-assisted suicide, and the Ninth Circuit Court
seemed to approve of Oregon Ballot Measure 16,
which provides legal immunity to physicians who fol-
low certain procedures when prescribing lethal drugs
to terminally ill patients with the intent that they use
them to commit suicide.1,14 State regulations requir-
ing such protections as second opinions and report-
ing would, however, take decision making away from
doctors and their patients.7 Moreover, if one agrees
with the Second Circuit Court’s analysis of equal
protection, the state is permitted to adopt the same
or substantially similar regulations for refusals of
treatment that “hasten death” as for physician-assist-
ed suicide. If states adopt such regulations, the hard-
won rights that the great majority of patients can
and do now exercise to refuse medical treatments are
put at risk, since mandatory procedural safeguards
can actually frustrate rather than foster the self-
determination of patients.15
The opinions can also be read as undercutting all
laws relating to schedule I drugs, as well as regula-
tion of medical experimentation, at least with regard
to patients near the end of life. If laws against assist-
ed suicide are unconstitutional because they deprive
terminally ill patients of relief from suffering, how
can laws that restrict their access to heroin or LSD
be constitutional?11 Contrary to the actions of these
courts, the Supreme Court has previously and unan-
imously endorsed the view of the Food and Drug
Administration that drug laws that require demon-
strated safety and efficacy forbid everyone, including
the terminally ill, to obtain unapproved drugs.16
The opinions of the two appeals courts have gar-
nered much editorial support in the press because
they seem to expand patients’ autonomy by giving
them another choice. In fact, however, by equating
the refusal of treatment with suicide, the opinions
may actually reduce patients’ rights by encouraging
state governments to regulate treatment refusals that
might “hasten death.” For those who believe that
when physicians honor treatment refusals they are
routinely engaged in assisted suicide and homicide,
these opinions mark an advance in protection for pa-
tients — but at the cost of taking decision making
away from doctors and their patients, and entangling
both in even more public and private bureaucracy
and scrutiny. Where the court sees only doctors,
patients, and the criminal law, physicians know that
contemporary medicine is much more complex, with
the real power shifting rapidly from physicians to
health plans. In this context, both physicians and
patients need medical ethics (including informed
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consent and the principle of the double effect) to
mean more than just immunity from criminal pros-
ecution.
CONCLUSIONS
By ignoring the past two decades of jurisprudence
concerning the right to refuse treatment (including
the rulings by state supreme courts that explicitly
hold that refusals of treatment are neither suicide
nor homicide),17-19 and by failing to make such basic
distinctions as those between the right to refuse
treatment and the right to die, between suicide and
assisted suicide, between law and ethics, and be-
tween ends and means, these courts virtually guar-
antee that their decisions will not be the last word
on the subject. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether it will hear the appeals of these de-
cisions. Since states have a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting all citizens, especially terminally ill and vul-
nerable citizens, it seems almost certain that the
Supreme Court will ultimately uphold state laws that
criminalize assisted suicide.13,20 Because of its cur-
rent stand on states’ rights, the Court is also likely
to permit states to decriminalize physician-assisted
suicide if they wish.21
There are real problems with the way patients die
under physicians’ care, and these rulings are impor-
tant demonstrations of how a large number of judg-
es view dying at the hands of modern medicine. The
SUPPORT study, for example, found that the fami-
lies of 50 percent of a sample of patients who died
in the hospital believed that the patients “experi-
enced moderate or severe pain at least half the time
during their last 3 days of life.”22 On the other hand,
a survey of patients with cancer published after these
court opinions were written found that those who
had seriously discussed suicide or euthanasia or who
hoarded drugs were more likely to be depressed or
have poor physical function than to be in serious
pain.23 Obviously we must understand the patients’
problems before we can be sure that our solution
will do more good than harm.
Shakespeare changed the traditional ending of the
legend on which he based his play to have both Lear
and Cordelia die, rather than to have Lear restored
to his throne and all live essentially happily ever after.
Shakespeare’s ending fits well with our postmodern
intimations of disaster and apocalypse, just as assist-
ed suicide seems a reasonable way out of our inabil-
ity to control the decay of our bodies. Nonetheless,
the more appropriate lines from King Lear in this
context may be the questions of Kent and Edgar
near the end of the play: “Is this the promised end?/
Or image of that horror?”
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